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Theories of Perception in Renaissance Humanism 
 
John Shannon Hendrix 
 
 
The relation between the sensible form and the intelligible form in perception 
and intellection is similarly described as a form of love in the De amore of 
Marsilio Ficino in the Renaissance. For Ficino, sensible objects have no con-
nection with each other, or with the perceiver. Without the ordering process 
of intellection in perception, the sensible world would not exist. Desire for 
God, or harmonious order in the world, is a desire for human reason in rela-
tion to the sensible world. In the first speech in De amore, made by Giovanni 
Calvalcanti, a friend of Ficino’s, to explain the speech made by Phaedrus in 
the Symposium of Plato, “turned toward God” (II.2),1 the intellectual in the 
soul, nous poietikos, “is illuminated by His ray,” and the appetite or desire of 
the intellectual is increased by the splendor of the ray. As the intellectual 
reaches toward God or cosmic intellect in its desire, “it receives form. For 
god, who is omnipotent, imprints on the Mind, reaching out towards Him, 
the nature of all things which are to be created.” In perception, the mind cre-
ates the form of all things perceived, as the intelligible form, prior to the ac-
tual perception, prior to the making of the imprint of the sensible object in 
the eye, the sensible form.       
      In the De amore, everything which is perceived is painted on the angelic 
mind, from which are created the forms of all sensible objects, like the arche-
typal forms which are created by the children of the demiurge of Plato. The 
forms of things are conceived in the celestial mind, and are called the ideas, 
as they are in the Timaeus. Without the ordering of the sensible world by rea-
son in perception, the world would only appear as disconnected chaos. Such 
perception is a function of the desire created in mind by reason. The first 
turning of the essence of mind to God from chaos is the birth of love, the in-
fusion of the illuminating ray of God is the nourishment of love, and the 
forming of the ideas is the perfection of love. The forms and ideas of the in-
tellect form a mundus or cosmos, which is the ornament, and the grace of the 
ornament is beauty. That which is most beautiful in the sensible world is that 
which most conforms to the forms and ideas in intellect, or the soul for 
Grosseteste, as the form and idea interact with the imprint of the sensible ob-
ject in perception, as the soul connects the sensible form and the intelligible 
form. Love attracts the mind to the beautiful, and allows the mind to become 
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beautiful, as it becomes more aware of the divine idea. The beauty of the 
ideas in the mind corresponds to the beauty of sensible objects, because it is 
the ideas in the mind which form sensible objects. Thus “the mind is turned 
toward God in the same way that the eye is directed toward the light of the 
sun,” in which it perceives the colors and shapes of things, which are formed 
from the inner light, the reflected spiritual light, which is the basis of the im-
agination, wherein the sensible form is formed, in the spiritual irradiation. 
      As the mind looks toward the illumination of the divine idea for Ficino, 
as the intellectual of Grosseteste would be informed by the cosmic intellect, 
“it is informed with the colors and shapes of things,” to which the sensible 
world conforms in the process of perception. Perception is a mechanism of 
the desire of the divine idea, the intelligibles, which order the sensible world, 
and allow it in turn to be loved by the perceiver. The world soul, the structure 
of the cosmos, turns toward the same ideas, and its turning is caused by love 
also. Love is the desire for beauty in De amore I.4, for “this is the definition 
of love among all philosophers,” as the beauty of the sensible world reinforc-
es the beauty of the soul. Beauty is described by Ficino as a three-fold grace 
which originates in harmonies: the harmony of virtues in souls, the harmony 
of colors and lines in bodies, and the harmony of tones in music. Harmony in 
soul is known by intellect, harmony in body is known by proportions in visu-
al perception, and harmony in sound is known by aural perception. It is 
through the intellect and perception that love is satisfied.       
      In the seventh speech in De amore, by Tommaso Benci, the relation be-
tween the sensible form and the intelligible form is explained. The medium 
by which the form of the idea, the intelligible, is transferred to the imprint of 
the sensible object or form, is the spirit. In De amore VI.6, images of exter-
nal bodies “cannot be imprinted directly on the soul because incorporeal sub-
stance…cannot be formed by them through the receiving of images.” Images 
cannot be immediately or directly perceived; there must be an intermediary 
which translates the images in perception, as Plotinus held. The soul, though, 
“easily sees the images of bodies shining in it, as if in a mirror.” The image 
can only be a reflection or representation of the idea or intelligible, the image 
in the soul. The intellect, through the medium of the spirit, corresponds the 
form of the idea with the form of the tupos (imprint) of the sensible body, 
and this operation is called the imagination. Imagination consists of the for-
mation of the species in the mind’s eye, which is a representation of the spe-
cies in perception, which is an intellectual representation to begin with of 
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sensible objects. Such images of the imagination retained in intellect consti-
tute memory.       
      For Ficino, this process is generated by the desire or appetite of the intel-
lect for the idea. The eye of the soul, or mind’s eye, in De amore, is “aroused 
to contemplate the universal ideas of things which it contains in itself,” and 
at the same time “the soul is perceiving a certain man in sensation, and con-
ceiving him in the imagination…” In both parts of this dual operation, love 
and desire are generated and reflected. While the soul can preserve an image 
in memory, in the retention of the mnemic residue, the eye in perception and 
the medium of spirit, as physical operations, “can receive images of a body 
only in its presence,” and can only reflect it, like a mirror. Once the image is 
not present, it is lost. The species can only be retained, and transformed in 
the imagination, through the operations of intellect in virtus intellectiva. The 
function of imagination in the soul is dominated by the eye and spirit, and 
also requires the presence of the species or form, and thus can only reflect it 
as a mirror.  
      In the Theologia Platonica of Marsilio Ficino in the fifteenth century, 
rays of light projected by the sun emanate in the form of the cone, and are 
reflected and refracted off of the surface of the agent as lumen, corporeal 
light. Rays of light from the sun pass through a hole in the pupil of the eye, 
where they are condensed in virtus (force, power) at the apex of a cone, and 
form the homogeneous species, and penetrate in the form of the cone into the 
soul, as the species in the form of the cone is reflected by the virtus intellec-
tiva  or intellectual in the oculus mentis (mind’s eye) as in a mirror, into the 
imagination (phantasia or imagination) of Grosseteste. Ficino describes the 
cone of light forming the species in the anima rationalis as a lens or pineal 
gland, mirroring or imitating physical reality, as for Grosseteste. The cone of 
light facilitates the vis aestimativa in the soul, which judges and measures 
distances in space in mathematical and geometrical terms, the dimensions 
given by light. The mechanisms of vision and cognition, in the intromission 
of light, are modeled on the extramission of light in the sensible world, from 
the originary spiritual light, lux spiritualis, in the illumination of the sensible 
world by a cosmic, divine intellect, intelligentia, as in the irradiatio spiritu-
alis of the intelligentia of Grosseteste.  
      As Ficino explained the process in De amore, the commentary on Plato’s 
Symposium, “When anyone sees a man with his eyes, he creates an image of 
the man in his imagination,” the sensible form, “and then ponders for a long 
time, trying to judge that image,” in the vis aestimativa. “Then he raises the 
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eye of his intellect,” the oculus mentis of the visus interior, “to look up to the 
Reason of Man which is present in the divine light,” the intelligible form as 
illuminated by the irradiatio spiritualis in the intelligentia, in Grosseteste’s 
terms. “Then suddenly from the divine light a spark shines forth to his intel-
lect and the true nature itself of Man is understood” (VI.13), the prior and 
universal cause of Grosseteste.       
      This is accomplished in a process of vision which combines the intromis-
sion and extramission of light in the eye, according to Ficino. In the De 
amore, as rays of light are sent out from the sun in the form of the cone and 
infused in intelligences, souls and bodies, through the reflected species, so 
rays of light or sparks of light are sent out from the body of the agent, 
through the eye, which is like a glass window, transparent and shining. The 
extramission of light from the eye is caused by the desire for the good, as the 
relation of the sun to sight is the same as the relation of the good to intelli-
gence for Plato, or the intelligentia to the virtus intellectiva for Grosseteste, 
and the source of beauty lies beyond the virtus intellectiva in the good, or the 
One of the lux spiritualis, where beauty is primal and absolute.  
      Ficino explained that some animals’ eyes glow in the dark, as from an 
inner light, and if one is poked in the eye he or she will see a light in the in-
ner eye. Similarly, in the Enneads of Plotinus, “At night in the darkness a 
gleam leaps from within the eye: or again we make no effort to see anything; 
the eyelids close; yet a light flashes before us; or we rub the eye and it sees 
the light it contains” (V.5.7).2 The extramission of light from the eye is a 
form of perception in itself for Plotinus; it is “sight without the act, but it is 
the truest seeing, for it sees light whereas its other objects were the lit not the 
light.” The mind’s eye is able to see the pure lumen spiritualis, incorporeal 
light, in the irradiation of the cosmic intellect. The inner light, or extramitted 
light, allows for the truest form of seeing, because it is a form of seeing not 
dependent on sense reality and material things. Plato described the inner light 
in the Timaeus: “For when the eyelids, which the gods invented for the 
preservation of sight, are closed, they keep in the internal fire; and the power 
of the fire diffuses and equalizes the inward motions” (45),3 the motions of 
the Same in the soul, as in the autodiffusion of the lux spiritualis in the form 
of a sphere.  
      In the De amore, Ficino related that certain great people in history, like 
the Emperor Augustus, had a light so powerful extramitted from their eyes 
that it rivaled the light of the sun; the virtus of the extramitted rays of light 
corresponds to the virtus of the individual in the intellectual. Rays of light 
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emanate from the eyes like the shooting of a dart, carrying a spirit or vapor, a 
virtus or species, which penetrates the eyes and soul of another person. This 
can result in the bewitching of a lover, and explains why some people who 
are not that attractive in body can excite an exceptional degree of love and 
desire. Love can only happen when the eyes of two people meet, when rays 
of light pass between them. For Plotinus in the Enneads, “it is precisely here 
that the greater beauty lies,” the beauty of the good, “perceived whenever 
you look to the wisdom in a man and delight in it, not wasting attention on 
the face, which may be hideous, but passing all appearance by and catching 
only at the inner comeliness, the truly personal” (V.8.2), the light of the eyes 
reflected from the soul. Inner beauty, the beauty of the good, can only be 
perceived by the soul which itself possesses inner beauty, as divine beauty 
can only be perceived by the soul in which the intellectual is illuminated by 
the cosmic intellect. 
      Leon Battista Alberti, a friend of Ficino in fifteenth-century Florence, 
conceived of perception as being facilitated by rays of light arranged in a 
cone or pyramid. In De pictura, his treatise on painting, surfaces of sensible 
objects are defined and measured in the vis aestimativa by rays of light 
which are extramitted from the surface as agent, and form a cone converging 
in an apex in the eye of the recipient. According to Alberti, the rays of light 
are the means by which visual matter is translated into intelligible matter, 
giving it the qualities of proportion and arrangement in geometry and math-
ematics, in the dimensions given by light. Through light, the sensible form is 
translated into the intelligible form by the intellectual. Alberti’s definitions of 
proportion and arrangement come from the De architectura of Vitruvius, 
where proportion is analogous to analogia or eurythmia, and arrangement is 
analogous to dispositione. Order (ordinatione) is defined as the arrangement 
of the proportion, which results in symmetry, which consists in dimension 
and distribution (oeconomia), the organization of modules or units of meas-
urement in mathematics and geometry. Arrangement (dispositione, or the 
Greek ideae) is the assemblage of the modules to elegant effect; proportion 
gives grace to a work in the arrangement of the modules in their context. Al-
berti, in his treatise on architecture, De re aedificatoria, followed Vitruvius 
in his definition of the concinnitas or beauty of a sensible object: “It is the 
task and aim of concinnitas to compose parts that are quite separate from 
each other by their nature, according to some precise rule, so that they corre-
spond to one another in appearance” (VII.4),4 as the varied parts of the sur-
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face of the agent are united at the apex of the cone of percpetion in the eye, 
in the sensible form as it is imprinted in the imagination. 
      In De lineis, Grosseteste described rays of light which extend from the 
apex of a pyramid on either side. Rays which are extended continuously and 
straight from the apex on one side form angles with rays extended on the 
other side. Alberti defined the rays on the outside of the pyramid, extended 
from the apex, as “extrinsic rays,” which are rays of light which define the 
outline, measure and dimension of surfaces, as described by Grosseteste. The 
extrinsic rays of Alberti define the outline of the cone of light in vision. As 
for Grosseteste, a cone is formed between the surface of the agent and the 
eye of the recipient. In the De pictura of Alberti, “The base of the pyramid is 
the surface seen, and the sides are the visual rays we said are called extrinsic. 
The vertex of the pyramid resides within the eye, where the angles of the 
quantities in the various triangles meet together” (I.7),5 as the virtus con-
verges in the apex for Grosseteste, and the species is unified in the process of 
the intellectual, nous poietikos, combining the sensible form or imprint, with 
the intelligible form, the idea or prior cause of the form. Alberti’s extrinsic 
rays of light measure quantity, which is “the space across the surface be-
tween two different points” (I.6), the dimensions given by the spiritual light; 
in between the extrinsic rays are what Alberti calls “median rays,” which fill 
in the space between the extrinsic rays, and which are probably reflected and 
refracted rays of light.  
      The median ray is contained within the space of the cone of light, and en-
closed by the extrinsic rays which form the cone. Median rays, which are 
weaker than extrinsic rays, as reflected or refracted, or the accidental rays of 
light of Grosseteste, are not strong enough to give dimensions, to define out-
lines and measurements, but instead are variable and differentiated, and ab-
sorb light and color to varying degrees. The median rays extend between the 
apex of the cone and the surface of the agent, and fill in the color and shadow 
found within the outline of the agent, filling in the substance of vision. 
Among the median rays, according to Alberti, one in the center of the cone 
stands out among them as the strongest, which is the “centric ray.” The cen-
tric ray forms a direct line from the apex of the cone to the center of the sur-
face of the agent, exactly perpendicular to the surface, as the perpendicular 
line would contain the most virtus for Grosseteste. According to Grosseteste 
in De lineis, “the rays of a longer pyramid are closer to perpendicular rays 
drawn from the extremities of the diameter of the agent and so are stronger, 
because a perpendicular entrance is strongest….”6 In the De natura locorum 
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of Grosseteste, the maximum virtus of the perpendicular ray of light is prov-
en in nature, as the perpendicular ray of light shines on the sphere of the 
earth, the spherical and concentric corpora mundi, only in the region of the 
tropics, where the ray of light is unreflected and unrefracted. The position of 
the centric ray of Alberti in the pyramid of light, along with the distance of 
the ray from the apex, as for Grosseteste, determines the disposition of the 
outline of the surface of the agent. The location of the centric ray determines 
the position of the outline. 
      As influenced by Alberti, Piero della Francesca, in his treatise on per-
spective in painting, De prospectiva pingendi, described the extrinsic rays in 
the pyramid or cone of vision as lines which emanate from the extremities of 
the surface of the object or agent and end up in the eye, in intromission, in 
between which the eye receives and discerns them, as they are subject to the 
judgment of the vis aestimativa. The border of the object is defined by the 
rays of light from the eye in extramission in proportion and measure. The 
borders of the object, established through measure and proportion by the ex-
trinsic rays from the eye, determine how things diminish in size in relation to 
the eye, as distances in space are learned in the process of visual experience. 
The size of objects, and the distances between objects, correspond to the 
sharpness of the angle in vision; the more acute the angle, the greater the vir-
tus, as for Grosseteste. In De lineis, Grosseteste explained that “the apex of a 
shorter pyramid will be more active, and so will alter a passive object more”  
(Eastwood, p. 125), because the rays of the shorter pyramid make lesser an-
gles than the rays of the longer pyramid if they are extended from the apex.   
      In the De prospectiva pingendi of Piero della Francesca, perspective is 
defined as commensuratio, and the elements of commensuratio are points, 
lines, and plane surfaces. The point is defined as that which has no parts, 
something which is beyond the sensible, according to geometers, something 
which does not contain quantity, or is incorporeal, as in the apex of the cone 
of vision. The point corresponds to the autodiffusion of lux of Grosseteste, 
from which emanate the rays of light which contain the species or virtus of 
the sensible world; the point also corresponds to the eye of the viewer, where 
the rays of light converge, and the species is unified, in the process of per-
ception. The point in the eye is the place at which the sensible form of the 
object, becomes the intelligible form of the object, as it is imprinted in the 
imagination by the cosmic intellect. The model of vision described by 
Grosseteste, and found in the treatises of Leon Battista Alberti and Piero del-
la Francesca, thus consists of two cones or pyramids of light in intromission 
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and extramission, intersecting, as it were. Light needs to extend from a point 
in the form of a cone in order to define the dimensions of the sensible world, 
and light needs to converge at a point in the eye, at the apex of a cone of rays 
of light, in order for the dimensions of the sensible world to be perceived. 
      De amore, or the Commentary on Plato’s Symposium, was written in 
1469, after Marsilio Ficino had finished translating the works of Plato for the 
Medici family. It was not published until 1484, when it was included with 
Ficino’s translations of Plato’s works from Greek to Latin. Ficino’s defini-
tion of beauty follows the Platonic definition as depending on a universal 
principle, that is, as given by language. According to Ficino, that which 
pleases the soul must be an incorporeal beauty, a conceptual representation 
not based in sense perception. In De amore, II.9, “beauty of the soul also is a 
splendor in the harmony of doctrines and customs,” in the matrix of language 
which creates the identity of the subject in terms other than sense perception. 
Desire in De amore is not a physical, instinctual desire, but a desire created 
by language in the construction of perception. In II.2, “For it is the same God 
whose beauty all things desire, and in possessing whom all things rest. From 
there, therefore, our desire is kindled.” Desire is governed by knowledge of 
God, knowledge of the archetypal principle in language. Perception, and 
judgments of beauty, are governed by the desire which is a function of lan-
guage. Perception and desire are constructed through language. The desire 
for the good in the circuitus spiritualis through the hypostases is that which 
governs artistic expression. 
      The hypostases are described in the first speech in De amore, made by 
Giovanni Calvalcanti, a friend of Ficino’s, to explain the speech made by 
Phaedrus in the Symposium of Plato. The hypostases are the angelic mind, 
the world soul, from Plato, and the world body. God himself is not accessible 
to the hypostases, as He is infinitely simple, and not of the world, which is 
necessarily multiple, and ornamental, that is, a product of perception. Both 
the ornamental machine of the world and the ideas behind the machine are 
created by the inaccessible God, just as the archetypal forms are created by 
the children of the demiurge in the Timaeus. The inaccessibility and infinite 
simplicity of the origin are qualities of the One of Plotinus. The world prior 
to the creation of forms is chaos, formless and dark. Chaos turns to order 
through the creation of the substance of the mind, the archetypal idea, which 
is its essence. The essence, which is itself formless and dark, is imbued with 
a desire to “turn towards God,” as it is born from God. The essence of mind, 
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the archetypal idea, is in Plotinus the Intellectual, that part of mind which 
understands the intelligibles, and in which the divine idea participates.  
      In De amore, everything which is perceived is painted on the angelic 
mind, from which are created the forms of all sensible objects, the spheres 
and the vapors, like the archetypal forms which are created by the children of 
the demiurge of Plato. The form of each type of sensible object is given a 
mythological character, to reinforce the fact that the forms are products of 
the celestial mind, that they determine perception of the sensible world, ra-
ther than being determined by it. The form or idea of the heavens, or the 
sphere of the fixed stars, is Uranus. The forms of the first two planets are 
Saturn and Jupiter. The form of fire is Vulcan, the form of air is Juno, the 
form of water is Neptune, and the form of earth is Pluto. Without the order-
ing of the sensible world by reason in perception, the world would only ap-
pear as disconnected chaos. Such perception is a function of the desire 
created in mind by reason itself for the operation of the human being in the 
sensible world, which depends on its ordering by reason, but in a process 
which is inaccessible to reason itself, which escapes the self-consciousness 
of reason, and is thus a function of the essence or intellectual. 
      One loves to look at nature because one loves the way that it conforms to 
their idea of the order of the world, as in mathematics and geometry. One 
loves the sensible world because it reinforces intellect, and the inaccessible 
source of the generation of ideas within it. The World Soul, the structure of 
the cosmos, turns toward the same ideas, from formlessness and chaos, and 
its turning is caused by love also. The world around the subject desires what 
the subject desires. The world becomes a world when it has received the 
forms from the mind, that is, when it is perceived. Without love, without the 
subject being present to perceive it, the world would just be formless matter, 
disconnected and haphazard. But love is innate in it, and it turns toward order 
in perception.  
      In De amore I.4, It is through the intellect and perception that love is sat-
isfied, as opposed to through bodily functions. The harmony in intellect cor-
responds to the harmony in vision and sound. The visual form of a work of 
art corresponds to the form of the ideas in the mind, and is thus considered 
beautiful, and incites desire, for beauty in form and virtue in mind. The work 
of art is successful if it incites that desire, the desire for God, and never sati-
ates that desire, as desire for the infinite and inaccessible can never be satiat-
ed. Thus the viewer would always have the desire to return to the work of art, 
and see it again, because it conforms to the desire of the intellect for the 
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good, or the idea of forms which orders the world in perception, and lan-
guage as well, as a function of perception. 
      The “beauty of the human body requires a harmony of different parts” in 
the same way that perception requires a harmony of forms and colors and 
language requires a harmony of words in a syntax. The harmony of the dif-
ferent parts of the body is itself a syntax. The form of each sensible object in 
perception which is shaped by the idea in the imprint is seen as a sign, or a 
signifier, as in language. To the signifier as form corresponds an idea, in the 
intellectual, as signified, just as an idea corresponds to a word in language. 
The sign in perception, a head or leg in a body, for example, corresponds to 
an idea of the head or leg in the intellectual. The harmony of the parts of the 
body is not given by the body, but by perception and intellect, as a function 
of desire; without the perceiver, the body is a chaotic, disconnected, arbitrary 
assemblage of parts, which in the Renaissance would be defined as the ugly. 
      Love, and desire, are functions of the graces, in intellectual, visual, and 
aural harmony. The “appetite which follows the other senses is not called 
love, but lust or madness.” Love between two people is a mutual desire for 
beauty, a reciprocal understanding of what beauty is, in both body and intel-
lect. In De amore II.9, love of the body is only in the visual perception of the 
body, in the beauty of the “splendor itself in the ornament of colors and 
lines.” The “desire to touch is not part of love…but rather a kind of lust and 
perturbation of a man who is servile.” Love in intellect is a mutual desire for 
those laws and customs which are seen as harmonious and beautiful. “Beauty 
of the soul also is a splendor in the harmony of doctrines and customs.” Pla-
tonic love, the idea of Ficino and not Plato, is the reciprocal desire for beauty 
in soul, the shared love of God. 
      When “we are attracted to a certain man as part of the world order,” as 
Carlo Marsuppini, a student of Ficino, suggests in the fifth speech of the 
Commentary on the Symposium, we find the person beautiful in so far as they 
conform, either physically or intellectually, to our idea of beauty as it exists 
in and is defined by the matrix of laws and customs in which we operate, that 
is, the ornament of the world, the cosmos. In V.5, we are attracted to that cer-
tain person “especially when the spark of the divine beauty shines brightly in 
him,” that is, his form corresponds to the light in our imagination. We find a 
person beautiful when “the appearance and figure of a well-constructed man 
correspond most closely with that Reason of Mankind which our soul re-
ceived from the author of all things and still retains.” Beauty is in the eye of 
the beholder, and beauty is culturally conditioned.       
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      As the beauty of a sensible object depends on its correspondence with the 
form of the imprint in perception as determined by the idea, “it happens that 
the external form of a thing, striking with its image the Form of the same 
thing depicted in the soul, either disagrees or agrees with it…” Whether the 
sensible object agrees with the form of the imprint or not depends on “a cer-
tain natural and hidden incongruity or congruity,” and then “moved by this 
hidden opposition or attraction, the soul either hates or loves the thing itself.” 
The hidden quality is that part of mind which is not accessible to discursive 
reason, nous pathetikos, the reason principle of Plotinus. The intellectual is 
the higher part of mind which is able to understand intelligibles, ideas in 
forms which are not apparent to logic or conscious reason. Marsuppini para-
phrases Enneads I.6.2 and V.3.3 of Plotinus. 
      At the end of his speech Marsuppini asked, if “anyone asked in what way 
the form of the body can be like the Form and Reason of the Soul and Mind, 
let him consider…the building of the architect.” The harmony of proportions 
of the work of art corresponds to the harmony of proportions in music, and 
the harmony of proportions in mathematics and geometry, instruments of the 
explicatum or unfolding of the intelligibles in intellect into the forms of dis-
cursive reason, as elaborated by Nicolas Cusanus. The analogy of the build-
ing of the architect, taken from the tenth book of the Republic and the sixth 
tractate of the first book of the Enneads, illustrates the correspondence be-
tween the architecture of the building and the architectonic, the transcenden-
tal idea, of the architect. The architectonic is the ornament or structure of the 
cosmos, as in the geometrical solids molded by the children of the demiurge 
in the Timaeus. The transcendental idea is the idea which pre-exists percep-
tion, the concepts which order the sensible world but do not exist in it, and 
all the proportional relations derived from them in mathematics and geome-
try in discursive reason.       
      The design of the building is the form of the sensible object which corre-
sponds to the idea of the architect. All forms in architecture and art are nec-
essarily ideas pre-existent in the mind of the architect or artist, even if they 
are arrived at by chance. The architecture of the building exists completely 
independently of its matter; architecture requires no matter at all, as it is the 
form of the architectonic. “Therefore go ahead,” Marsuppini says, “subtract 
its matter if you can (and you can subtract it mentally), but leave the design. 
Nothing of body, nothing of matter will remain to you.” The form of the art 
or architecture is identical to the idea in the mind, in the process of the imag-
ination which is the Vorstellung, picture thinking, which is ordered in lan-
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guage, as well as mathematics and geometry. In the Vorstellung, pictures are 
transformed into words as they become mnemic residues. The mnemic resi-
due of the imprint becomes the word in language as the spirit of the divine 
becomes the logos, and the order of the syntax of the language, of words or 
forms, corresponds to the order of the idea. 
      Tommaso Benci summed up the theses of the Commentary. In VI.8, the 
form of a body, the shape of a sensible object, is received by the eye, and by 
penetrating the spirit, corresponds to the figure of the idea of the body which 
is contained in divine intellect. The correspondence “pleases the soul,” pro-
ducing the grace of love which is beauty, because it “corresponds to those 
Reasons which both our intellect and our power of procreation preserve as 
copies of the thing itself,” the power of procreation being the imagination, 
the reasons being the linguistic equivalent of the figure in the picture think-
ing, the basis of memory. In perception, an imprint of a figure is received by 
the eye, and it is matched to a figure in the imagination, and transferred to 
reason in language, and through the intervention of divine intellect, the figure 
is understood in relation to the architectonic of the cosmos, which results in 
beauty and love.  
      In VI.13, all things are understood by the light of the divine intellect, 
“but the pure light itself and its source we cannot see in this life,” as it is that 
part of soul or intellect which is inaccessible. Intellect “can turn to this light 
whenever it wishes,” through “purity of life and intense concentration of de-
sire,” and in so doing “it shines with the sparks of the Ideas.” Accessing the 
essence of mind, divine intellect, in reason requires effort, and each individ-
ual is free to either make the effort, or to live a life among shadows, being 
manipulated in thought by sensual forms and sensual desires. 
      Cristoforo Marsuppini, another student of Ficino, further summarized the 
Commentary in the seventh speech. In VII.1, memory in intellect is described 
as a mirror which reflects an image of the figure of a sensible object like a 
ray of light through the eyes, so that another image is formed, as if a piece of 
wool next to the mirror might be set on fire by the light reflected by the mir-
ror, and the blazing wool would be an image of the sun. The image of the 
blazing wool in the imagination is a splendor of the first image, “by which 
the force of desire is kindled and loves,” as perception is a function of desire. 
      In the summation of Marsuppini, “love, kindled in the appetite of sense, 
is created by the form of the body seen through the eyes,” as perception is a 
function of desire, but in perception or imagination the form of the body is 
without matter. The lack of the matter of the form of the body in vision cre-
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ates desire, the desire caused by lack, in the disjunction between form and 
matter. When the figure of the form of the body in the imagination is trans-
formed to or made to correspond to the figure of the form of the archetype in 
intellect, it is transformed from a particular form to a universal idea in a pro-
cess of abstraction. Thus “there immediately appears in the intellect another 
species of this image, which no longer seems to be a likeness of one particu-
lar human body, as it was in the fancy, but a common Reason or definition of 
the whole human race equally.” The particular form becomes an instrument 
in reason by which a universal abstraction is made, as in the Symposium, by 
which an idea is formed which orders experience. 
      As Plato divided beauty into the terrestrial and celestial, venere vulgare 
and venere celeste, as illustrated in the Birth of Venus of Alessandro Botticel-
li, so love is divided by Marsuppini into bodily love and intellectual love. A 
“love inclined toward the senses” resides in “the appetite of sense devoted to 
the body,” while “another love which is very foreign to commerce with the 
body” resides in or arises from “intellect’s universal species or Reason.” As 
sensible objects can only be given as representations in intellect, so the love 
which resides in the senses can only be given by the love which resides in 
intellect, and can only be seen as false, without essence, as are objects out-
side of perception. 
      The premise of perspective construction is that the real world is not im-
mediately perceived, that it is given to us through the intermediary of geome-
try and mathematics, that vision is a conceptual process. Perspective in 
painting reproduces the world as geometrically constructed. A scene con-
structed with perspective appears more real or natural to us precisely because 
it is not real or natural, because our perception of the world around us does 
not correspond to the world as it actually exists. This is the thesis of Imman-
uel Kant, and it is also a basis for the theory of perception of Plotinus. The 
Enneads of Plotinus were translated into Latin by Marsilio Ficino in the Re-
naissance. Although there is no reference to Plotinus’ theory of perception in 
the major treatises on perspectival construction written during the Renais-
sance—that is, the De pictura of Leon Battista Alberti or the De prospectiva 
pingendi, On Perspective in Painting, of Piero della Francesca—Plotinus’ 
development of Plato’s theory of vision is present in the theoretical basis of 
Renaissance perspective. References to Plato by Alberti and Piero form the 
basis of the Neoplatonic element of Renaissance artistic theory. But Ficino 
did not begin the translation of Plotinus until 1484, fifty years after Alberti’s 
treatise and ten years after Piero’s treatise. 
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      Perspective construction, or costruzione legittima, was seen as both a 
model of vision and a geometrical allegory of Neoplatonic emanation, in Le-
on Battista Alberti’s De pictura and Piero della Francesca’s De prospectiva 
pingendi. In the De prospectiva pingendi, perspective construction is a form 
of commensuratio in painting, or proportion, based on the progression from 
point to line to surface to body. Such a progression serves as a model for the 
unfolding or explicatum of the material world, as can be found in the Timae-
us, Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, and Proclus’ Commentary on the First 
Book of Euclid’s Elements, all available from medieval translations. The ge-
ometric progression corresponds to Piero’s pyramid of vision, following the 
theory of percpetion of Alberti in De pictura, and corresponding to Ficino’s 
model in the Theologia Platonica of 1482. 
      Of the three parts of painting, Piero declared at the beginning of De pro-
spectiva pingendi, only commensuratio would be discussed, or perspective, 
but “mixing in parts of disegno, without which it is impossible to demon-
strate perspective.”7 Color would be left out, but the parts of painting would 
be discussed “that can be demonstrated with angled lines and proportions, 
that is, the points, lines, surfaces and bodies.”8 These classifications corre-
spond to the definitions of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry. Piero identified 
five elements that need to be considered in the perspective construction of a 
painting: sight, or the eye; the form of the thing seen; the distance from the 
eye to the thing seen; the lines that connect the eye to the extremities or bor-
dering lines of the thing seen; and the area between the eye and the thing 
seen.9 These five elements need to be understood in order to understand per-
spectival construction. 
      The eye is defined as that in which are represented all of the things seen 
under different angles. Objects appear as images in the eye depending on the 
angle of projection of the lines from the extremities of the objects to the eye; 
the larger the angle, the closer and larger the object. Objects in space occupy 
a hierarchy of being, or value, given by the variation in the relation to the an-
gle of projection. This is stated in the Eighth Theorem of Euclid’s Optica.10  
      Sensible things, or objects in the sensible world, are therefore abstracted 
and transformed into images in the eye through geometry. The images in the 
eye exist as copies of the sensible objects, and the objects become intelligible 
in the mind’s eye, or objects of the intellect. This is a core idea in the Enne-
ads of Plotinus. In the Enneads V.5.7, “actual seeing is double; take the eye 
as an example, for it has one object of sight which is the form of the object 
perceived by the sense, and one which is the medium through which the form 
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of its object is perceived, which is also itself perceptible to the eye; it is dif-
ferent from the form, but is the cause of the form’s being seen….” The forms 
and proportions of sensible things are constructed in the mind, from the idea 
of the things, or the intelligibles, which are translated to the sensible world 
through mathematics and geometry, by way of perspective construction as it 
plays a role in vision. It is the form of the thing, according to Piero della 
Francesca, rather than the thing itself, without which the intellect cannot 
judge nor can the eye comprehend the thing. For Plotinus, in III.6.1, “sense 
perceptions are not affections but activities and judgments concerned with 
affections….” Things in the real world cannot be received immediately 
through sense perception as themselves, because sense perception itself is a 
cognitive process. In the twentieth century, David Layzer wrote, in Cosmo-
genesis: the growth of order in the universe, “Human visual perception is a 
cyclical process in which the brain constructs, tests, and modifies perceptual 
hypotheses. In order to have a percept, we must construct it.”11  
      In the Enneads IV.7.6, Plotinus distinguished between perception and 
what might be called apperception, or multiple perceptions. Actual perceptu-
al experience is multiple and diversified; perceived objects have no neces-
sary connections in size or position, and can be perceived in a variety of 
ways by the different senses. But in human perception all objects and acts of 
perception are unified to form a coherent whole which structures the world 
around us. When the fragmented and variable objects of perception “reach 
the ruling principle they will become like partless thoughts…”; they are or-
ganized in a conceptual process. Perception entails the intersection of the 
immediately perceived image, the percipi or imago in psychoanalytic terms, 
with a conceptual process, which involves what might be called a priori con-
cepts, in Kantian terms, and concepts which are activated by sensory activity. 
The possibility of the a priori concept in Plotinus’ model of perception is 
suggested by Mike Wagner in his dissertation, Concepts and Causes: The 
Structure of Plotinus’ Universe. According to Kant, in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, space and time are conceptual structures which do not exist in the 
real world, or are not given by the senses. The nature and existence of the 
world around us outside of our ordering of it in the structures of space and 
time is unknowable to us. We can only know the world as our own geometri-
cally constructed version of it, as our representation of it to ourselves. Per-
spective construction, as defined by Alberti and Piero, constitutes the world 
as we can know it as a representation of it to ourselves in abstract and mini-
mal, universal terms. 
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      Plotinus described perception as a dialectic of the universal and particu-
lar, to put it in Hegelian terms. The perceived object is both whole and divid-
ed into parts. In the process of perception “there will come to be an infinity 
of perceptions for each observer regarding the sense object, like an infinite 
number of images of the same thing in our ruling principle” (IV.7.6). It is the 
conceptual process which structures the infinite subdivision of perception, as 
in the explicatum of Nicolas Cusanus; the unity of perceptual experience is 
inaccessible, as is the vanishing point of perspective in relation to the lines of 
emanation, or the unity of the One in the point. Plotinus suggests what 
Jacques Lacan confirms in the twentieth century; we are inherently frag-
mented beings in our representation of the world to ourselves in perception 
as a function of our conceptual processes. We are caught in a perpetual cycle 
of desire to overcome our own fragmentation, which manifests itself in the 
concept of the metaphysic. Perspective construction represents the dialectic 
of the inescapable fragmented and multiple nature of perception and the met-
aphysical unity towards which desire leads us; perspective construction is 
thus a graph of desire, for our own unattainable unity, and for the real exist-
ence of the world around us beyond our representation of it to ourselves.  
      For Plotinus, perception is a function of this desire, and a mechanism of 
the conceptual process, and memory in particular. He asks, “does our re-
memberance of the things we desired accompany our power of desiring…?” 
(IV.3.28). The conceptual process is composed of the perceived object, de-
sire, and memory. “On this assumption the desiring power is moved by what 
it enjoyed when it sees the desired object again, obviously by means of the 
memory. For why should it not be moved when something else is seen, or 
seen in a different way?” Thought in Plotinus, as a kind of Hegelian picture-
thinking, is composed of mnemic residues of perceived objects, what Ploti-
nus calls “imprints” in “recollections.” In V.3.2, “as for the things which 
came to it [that is, soul] from Intellect, it observes what one might call their 
imprints…and it continues to acquire understanding as if by recognizing the 
new and recently arrived impressions and fitting them to those which have 
long been within it: this process is what we should call the ‘recollections’ of 
the soul.” Our thoughts are propelled by the desire created by the multiple 
and fragmented images of perception, by the desire to reconnect the mnemic 
residues of images given by the senses in our minds to the world around us. 
As Plotinus describes it, “the reasoning power in soul makes its judgment, 
derived from the mental images present to it which come from sense-
perception, but combining and dividing them….”  
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      The desire is always thwarted because of the barrier put up by our a prior 
conceptual structuring of the world, so the desire is perpetual and never sati-
ated. The mnemic residue would be defined by Sigmund Freud as the Vor-
stellungsrepräsentanz, the representation of the representation, as derived 
from Hegel; and the mnemic residue is at the core of the Plotinian concept of 
the intellectual, or nous, that which is other than discursive reason in mind. 
Renaissance perspective construction is generally seen by twentieth-century 
scholars as being a limited and prohibitive form of representation in art be-
cause it does not allow for the uninhibited role of the imago or the mnemic 
residue, as in dreams, to exist outside of discursive reason. Perspective con-
struction posits discursive reason as an absolute regulator of perceptual expe-
rience, because the metaphysical is only accessible through logic. This is the 
legacy of the Renaissance.       
      Plotinus did not deny that what we perceive in the world around us is ac-
tually there, as George Berkeley might, but he suggests that things appear to 
us as they are modified by our perception; ultimately we see the form of the 
thing, but not the thing itself. A perceived object is only known to us as a 
mental perception, and a mental perception is only known to us as a memory; 
the production of the mental perception in memory constitutes cognition as 
an “image-making power,” as in Hegelian picture-thinking. In Enneads 
IV.3.29, “nothing will prevent a perception from being a mental image for 
that which is going to remember it, and the memory and the retention of the 
object from belonging to the image-making power….” Through this process, 
perception as a form of cognition arrives at a conclusion, as the perception of 
the form of the image is absorbed into a cognitive process, and the fragment-
ed and multiple apperception is transformed into perception, which involves 
the superimposition of a conceptual structure onto the perceived world, as in 
perspective construction. “If then the image of what is absent is already pre-
sent in this, it is already remembering, even if the presence is only for a short 
time.” The mnemic image replaces the perceived image which replaces the 
thing, exactly as in Freud’s Vorstellungsrepräsentanz.  
      Given that we can only know the world around us as images reproduced 
in cognition, we can only know the world around us as an absence. Such an 
absence is represented in perspective, which precludes any other possibility 
of knowing the world around us outside of our cognition of it. The absence is 
present in the vanishing point, as a negative or apophatic theology; in Platon-
ic terms, the essence of the world is unknowable. In Lacanian terms, the ab-
sence is the real, that which is inaccessible to either the symbolic, the 
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structures of language and perception, or the imaginary, the immediately 
perceived imago, which can only be known as it is absorbed into cognition. 
The real is that around which desire circulates; we are defined by a continual 
dialectic of presence and absence, of our representations of the world to our-
selves and the unattainable source of those representations.  
      The vanishing point of perspective construction in the Renaissance corre-
sponds in architecture to the altar at the end of the nave of the church, to the 
location of the transubstantiation in the Eucharist, to the point at which the 
material world, or our representation of it to ourselves, becomes immaterial, 
and inaccessible. The system of perspective, as developed by Filippo Brunel-
leschi for the design of the basilica church, entailed this symbolic aspect. In a 
painting such as Leonardo da Vinci’s Last Supper in the refectory of the 
Church of Santa Maria della Grazie in Milan, the vanishing point of the per-
spective corresponds to a void through a painted window in the center which 
corresponds to the location of the figure of Christ as the material manifesta-
tion of the immaterial. The receding lines which construct the illusionistic 
space from the vanishing point also continue beyond the picture plane to 
construct the space of the refectory itself. We not only perceive this illusion-
istic space, but we inhabit it, and we are drawn through it to the point at 
which it fails to exist outside out own perception and cognition. In Baroque 
representation, the regular geometry of the emanation of the illusionistic 
world is replaced by irregular tumult and chaos in relation to the ineffable 
vanishing point, as in the Assumption of the Virgin in the Cathedral of Parma 
by Antonio Correggio, for example. In the Baroque it is no longer possible to 
approach the point at which reason fails through reason itself, because reason 
itself, or reason in perception, is seen as fragmented and multiple and inade-
quate, corresponding to the model of Plotinus.  
      According to Plotinus, in IV.3.30, “The intellectual act is without parts 
and has not, so to speak, come out into the open, but remains unobserved 
within, but the verbal expression unfolds its content and brings it out of the 
intellectual act into the image-making power, and so shows the intellectual 
act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and 
memory of it.” Beyond language and perception the intellectual act is inac-
cessible to us, except as a reflection in hindsight. Beyond the scaffolding of 
our thoughts and perceptions, we are inaccessible to ourselves, as in psycho-
analysis the unconscious is inaccessible to conscious thought except through 
the fragments of dream images, according to Freud, or the fragments of lin-
guistic functions, according to Lacan. For Lacan, meaning in language only 
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exists as a reflection in hindsight after the speech-act has taken place. What 
lies behind our own thoughts is only accessible to us as fragmented and di-
versified mnemic images in picture-thinking, which constitute a reality as or-
dered by the vanishing lines in perspective. The vanishing point is that point 
at which we can see behind the mirror, as we are caught between the reflec-
tions of the sensible and intelligible, and we can see that there is nothing 
there, nothing beyond our constructed perception of the world. 
      A diagram of intersecting pyramids of light appeared in the De coniec-
turis (On Conjecture) of Nicolas Cusanus, written between 1440 and 1445 as 
a sequel to his major theoretical work, De Docta Ignorantia (On Learned Ig-
norance). Cusanus described the intersecting pyramids as a figura paradig-
matica, a paradoxical figures of light and dark, representing the progression 
from unity to alterity and alterity to unity, as, from Plato, all things are com-
posed of the combination of contradictories, in the coincidentia oppositorum 
or coincidence of opposites. The base of the pyramid of Cusanus is the dark-
ness of primordial origin, the inaccessible which precedes the sensible world, 
while the apex is infinite unity, the lux spiritualis. In between the base and 
the apex, bordered by the extrinsic rays of light, is found all sensible matter. 
As the pyramids intersect, unity is everywhere contained in alterity and alter-
ity is everywhere contained in unity, as all sensible matter is made possible 
by the spiritual light.   
      In the seventeenth century, intersecting pyramids of light and dark ap-
peared in the Microcosmi Historia (Microcosmic History) of Robert Fludd, 
published in Oppenheim by Johannes Theodore de Bry in 1619, as part of the 
series Utriusque Cosmi Historia. Corresponding to the celestial hierarchies, 
Fludd conceived the universe as composed of three pyramids: body, soul and 
spirit, divided into three parts each, terrestrial, celestial and supercelestial. 
The pyramids of light proceed from the apex of the spirit, the lux spiritualis, 
to the base of matter, alterity and complexity. The procession is created by 
light from the sun, the lumen solaris, which divides the world in substantial 
parts. In the diagram of intersecting pyramids of Fludd, the base of the pyra-
mid of light is the Trinity, represented as the sun, and the base of the pyramid 
of darkness is primordial unformed matter, represented as the earth. Inter-
secting pyramids of light and dark also appear in the Prodromus Coptus Sive 
Aegyptiacus (1636), Obeliscus Pamphilius (1650), and Musurgia universalis 
(1650) of Athanasius Kircher in seventeenth-century Rome.         
      By 1634, Kircher had already published, in Primitiae Gnomonicae Ca-
topticae, a study of light and optics. The study was elaborated in Ars magna 
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lucis et umbrae and Musurgia universalis. In Primitiae Gnomonicae Catopti-
cae, Kircher described intersecting pyramids as representing the diffusion of 
light from the apex or archetypal form, the prior cause, into the sensible 
world, which is transmitted in the intellectual, nous poietikos, and reflected 
as in a mirror in the soul to form the sensible form of the archetypal principle 
or intelligible, the intelligible form. In the intersecting pyramids described in 
the Primitiae Gnomonicae Catopticae, the rational forming principles of 
matter are transmitted as ideas by light from the sun into the material world. 
The sensible form is created at the point of intersection of the two pyramids, 
representing the intromission and extramission of light in perception. The in-
tersection is also the point at which a perpendicular line from the sun, the 
median ray of Alberti, would touch the reflective plane of the pyramids, the 
surface of the agent.         
      Intersecting pyramids serve to illustrate a proto-scientific theory of vision 
and light in the Primitiae Gnomonicae Catopticae of Kircher. One pyramid 
is formed with the apex at a point on the surface of visible things and the 
base in the sphere of the eye (what René Descartes would call the crystalline 
humor,12 or lens), while the other pyramid is formed with the apex at the cen-
ter of the back of the sphere of the eye (what Descartes would call the optic 
nerve, or retina) and the base on the surface of visible things, forming a mir-
ror image. The pyramid with the apex in visible things corresponds to a pol-
ished body, reflecting the sensible form, while the pyramid with the apex in 
the eye corresponds to a luminous body, emanating light in extramission, 
from the reflected spiritual light, lumen spiritualis. A perpendicular line con-
nects the center points and the point of intersection of the pyramids.  
      Form is made visible as the species sensibilis as it moves along the 
straight line through a point at the center of the surface of visible things, and 
then spreads out in lines to form a continuous body or sphere, as for Grosse-
teste, as it is perceived by the eye. As Kircher explains, “As the form of the 
point of the surface of visible things moves towards appearance according to 
one perpendicular line, it meets the surface in one point, directly visible to 
the eye. The line extends to all points of a sphere, all concurring in a center, 
so that all the lines make a continuous body, and the continuous surface is 
made visible at each point, which is the central boundary of the eye.”13 The 
formation of sensible objects in the dimensions of light in space corresponds 
to the formation of the species sensibilis in the mechanisms of the eye in vi-
sion. “In this manner every line extends from the apex of a pyramid as the 
center of the eye,” in the extramission of light, “with the base being the sur-
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face of visible things,” the surface of the agent. “Form as the points [of light] 
on the surface of visible things extends along straight lines, through each 
point, and the apex of the pyramid, which is the center of the image, in the 
liquid surface of the undercoat of the eye, divided by the pyramid,” in the in-
tromission of light. “A polished body opposes a luminous body, creating a 
point of light,” in the intersection of the intromission and extramission, sen-
sible and intelligible, in the coincidentia oppositorum. “Over the surface of 
the polished body a pyramid is formed with the apex in the mirror reflection 
of the image,” in the soul or anima rationalis, “and the base in the surface of 
the luminous body, proceeding through the pyramid to the opposite point, 
whose point is itself a luminous body, the true base in the surface of the pol-
ished body, said to be vision.”  
      Lines extended from a point of vision to the continuous body of a sphere 
form the shape of a pyramid, and it is along these lines which light moves to 
make form visible, to actuate the species sensibilis. “Through every line light 
moves to the image. The linear reflection of the inner position is the result of 
the linear movement of light.”14 Light is conceived of in terms of straight 
lines, the lines emanating from an apex to form a pyramid. In an analogue of 
the process of creation, the species is made visible through the intersection of 
the pyramids in the field of vision in the formation of the spheres of the visi-
ble and its mirror image in the eye. 
      In Kircher’s scheme, human intellection is based on the process of the 
construction of vision in perception, as it is for Grosseteste, as light is re-
flected through an idea in vision. The sun, as the source of rational forming 
principles or intelligibles, in the irradiatio spiritualis, is described as a lumi-
nous body; thus “light descends from the luminous body to form a reflected 
body, perceived as a point on a surface, at which point the two pyramids in-
tersect.”15 The spiritual light is reflected to form the image of matter, the spe-
cies sensibilis, which is seen to be an imperfect simulacrum of the 
intelligible, the species apprehensibilis, as represented on the frontispiece of 
Kircher’s Ars magna lucis et umbrae. The image provided by the spiritual 
light, reflected as in a mirror, reverberates through a denser medium, refract-
ed and deviated, in the soul. Without the illumination of the intelligentia or 
cosmic intellect of Grosseteste, in the development of the virtus intellective 
or intellectual, the sensible form can only be seen as a distorted and corrupt-
ed version of the intelligible form, as it is subject to the corporeal functions 
of the soul, and can only be the Platonic shadow of reality. 
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      The same model of the formation of the species sensibilis was described 
by Marsilio Ficino in the Theologia Platonica in 1469: “the soul accomplish-
es in the body an admirable task as the divine ray, filled with ideas, descends 
at once to the soul, compelled by the vital force of the soul and by its quality 
in the matter of the universe,” but “in which it forms certain distant and 
blurred representations of ideas as light forms images of colors in a mirror, or 
a drawing on the ground forms shadows of divinities.”16 Kircher explains in 
the Ars magna lucis et umbrae that in the soul, the archetypes or intelligibles 
are manifest in copies in the species sensibilis, while being intelligible in the 
intellect, in the species apprehensibilis. Unity and singularity in the intelligi-
ble in the virtus intellectiva, as illuminated by the lux spiritualis, become 
multiple and diffused through the functions of the anima rationalis.17 In the 
seventeenth century, the divine intellect can only be known through simili-
tudes in shadow, as the similitudes are “reflections of divine forces in the 
mirror of the angelic intellect.”18   
      Light is described by Kircher in the Primitiae Gnomonicae Catopticae as 
“radiating in a fertile manner, stimulating motion and desire,”19 as in the De 
amore of Ficino, “turned toward God,” the virtus intellectiva “is illuminated 
by His ray,” and the desire of the virtus intellectiva is increased by the splen-
dor of the ray. For Kircher light is diffused in a celestial sphere, as in Grosse-
teste, in which divine intelligence, intelligentia, is manifest in images and 
forms, species sensibilis, through geometrical abstraction and intellectual or-
ganization in the virtus intellectiva. According to Kircher, “Light is a symbol 
of the goodness and truth of God,” a symbol of the good, “passed through 
desire through angelic and human intelligence, according to Pseudo-
Dionysius. In the heavens, according to Hermes Trismegistus, life is a copy 
of the divine mind made by the angels,” or the children of the demiurge of 
Plato, “as the unfolding of virtue, as Plato also says. A certain energy is im-
planted in fire from above, and everything accessible to the senses is diffused 
by grace and divine goodness, in copies and images.”20  
      The source of the transmission of the light is incomprehensible to the vir-
tus intellectiva, in the mechanisms of the virtus cogitativa, and can only be 
intuited through sensation and apprehension for Kircher. According to 
Kircher, “light diffused in all natural things is as an incomprehensible good 
(as Marsilio Ficino says), undefined by philosophers, a clear light from an 
unknown source,”21 the lux spiritualis. As Pseudo-Dionysius explained in the 
Mystical Theology and Epistles, “the creation of the visible universe is a veil 
placed before the invisible things of God....visible things are in truth clear 
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images of the invisible,”22 though corrupted simulacra, created by the mech-
anisms of vision. As God is incomprehensible, and the source of all light and 
life, according to Pseudo-Dionysius, He is “the highest peak of mystic inspi-
ration, eminently unknown yet exceedingly luminous,” as the source of light, 
“where the pure, absolute and unchanging mysteries of theology are veiled in 
the dazzling obscurity of the secret silence, outshining all brilliance with the 
intensity of their darkness, and surcharging our blinded intellects with the ut-
terly impalpable and invisible splendor surpassing all beauty,”23 in the via 
negativa of negative theology. 
      In the Obeliscus Pamphilius of 1650, Kircher described the form of the 
pyramid as four inclined surfaces sloping from an apex to a base, extending 
into the material world and forming all things in nature from a single princi-
ple and source. God the highest artisan is diffused into various species. The 
pyramid represents the primordial origin of the world, from Egyptian theolo-
gy, as life flows from a motionless sun into a previously formless universe, 
as described by Kircher.24 The four corners of the base of the pyramid are the 
four platonic elements which constitute the underlying structure of the mate-
rial world, Fire, Air, Water and Earth. The obelisk was also described in the 
Obeliscus Pamphilius as being composed of the triangular apex of the divine, 
the shaft of angelic transmission in descent and ascension between the celes-
tial and terrestrial, and the quadripartite base of the material world. The four 
sides of the three regions form the twelve locations of the zodiac, comprising 
all of existence. The obelisk is called the finger of the sun; the rays of the sun 
depart from the apex, as can be seen on a stela in the Egyptian Museum in 
Cairo. The four elements of the base are formed from primordial chaos in the 
sublunary world.25  
      The world as it is perceived is a product of the world as it is understood 
in the virtus intellectiva, as a product of the engagement of the intelligentia., 
in mathematics and geometry. As Francesco Giorgi expressed in De Harmo-
nia Mundi in 1525, “According to the writings of Pythagoras it was believed 
that in these numbers and proportions the fabric of the soul and the whole 
world was arranged and perfected.”26 In the Divina proportione of 1509, Lu-
ca Pacioli explained that while music considers harmonic proportion, the vis-
ual image considers arithmetic and geometry, as sight is the first door to the 
intellect.27    
        In his Arithmologia, sive De abditis Numerorum mystriis (Arithmology, 
or the Concealed Mystery of Numbers), published in Rome in 1665, Athana-
sius Kircher developed the idea of Nicolas Cusanus that the universe and 
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creation are contained in a series of numbers, extending in gradations from 
the simplest unit, or God or Monad. All numbers flow forth in multitude 
from the Monad, the supercelestial realm of unity and abyss. As numbers 
emanate from unity, they are composed by the intellect.  
        Numbers for Kircher “begin from unity or the superterrestrial Monad 
and are joined together as they are conceived or perceived in the intellect, or 
examined by sight in vision, composed according to order, type and spe-
cies.”28 They are thus a manifestation of the fruitfulness of the eternal or 
cosmic mind. The monad is the beginning principle which incites motion and 
alterity in the material world. “From this the Four Elements are formed, and 
the alternation of time, the motion of the stars, and the revolution of the 
heavens.”29  The unity and simplicity of the monad are from a celestial 
source which causes all multiplicity and fertility and which surpasses human 
intellect. 
        Kircher explained that the discernment of numbers by the intellect ema-
nating from the divine mind provides the means by which the divine mind 
can be incorporated into the human mind (the similitudines intelligibilium 
impressas ab eisdem intellectui nostro of the Accademia di San Luca), in that 
numbers are an abstraction of material reality. “God in creation becomes our 
mind in the production of numbers. The Divine Mind divides everything, as 
our mind discerns everything. God divides and produces things in real sub-
stance, while ours divides and produces only numbers, which are similitudes 
of Divine divisions.”30 Following Cusanus, the unity of the monad becomes 
multiple by first repeating itself or doubling. Doubling, the beginning of all 
creation, contains the necessary opposite forces of creation. The necessary 
opposite forces of creation are added to the unity to produce the trinity, the 
most basic composition of the substance of creation. In the geometrical ab-
straction of the intellect “the trinity is the first principle of all rectilinear fig-
ures, developed from the binary and the unity, as symbolized by the sign of 
the pyramid,”31 according to Kircher.  
        The triangle is the primary geometrical unity, symbolizing the connec-
tions between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and it is “the first unity which 
is the source and origin of all surfaces and rectilinear figures.”32 As Kircher 
describes in Arithmologia, the triangle symbolizes connections between: Di-
vine, Angelic and Human; Rational, Sensible and Vegetative; Mind, Intellect 
and Reason; Concept, Word, Symbol; and Point, Line, Surface.33 The trian-
gle participates in the dyad of opposites in that maximum and minimum co-
incide in the pyramid as they do in the center and circumference of the circle, 
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a reference to the thought of Cusanus, for whom the structure of being is 
analogous to a circle whose center and circumference are both everywhere 
and nowhere, combining the finite and the infinite. The center corresponds to 
the infinite abyss of the divine, and is carried by radii to every point of the 
circumference. In the De Docta Ignorantia of Cusanus, “Since the world 
cannot be enclosed within a material circumference and center, it is unintelli-
gible without God as its center and circumference.”34  
        Following the thought of Plato, Kircher described the process of crea-
tion in geometric terms as the progression from point to line to surface to sol-
id— the geometrical progression by which architecture is created. From the 
point of the monad, “a line is extended which divides the interval of the dy-
ad, creating the surface of the trinity.”35 From the surface of the trinity, a 
complete body is created, extended, divided, and measured in intervals. All 
of the Platonic solids are composed of equilateral triangles, the simplest be-
ing the cube, corresponding to earth. “The quadruple or cube is the first solid 
body formed from numbers. The body is generated in quadruple order, in 
substance, quantity, quality and location.”36 Each of the four orders of the 
body, generated by the underlying abstracted principles of creation in num-
bers, correspond to elements of the motion and multiplicity incited by the 
monad. “Substance corresponds to generation and corruption, quantity to 
augmentation and diminution, quality to motion and alterity, location to har-
mony and correspondence.”37   
        “The quadruple order is perceptible to the senses”38 in the form of the 
Pythagorean tetractys, the geometrical representation of the process of crea-
tion as a series of progressions from unity to the dyad to the trinity to the 
quadrant, the sum of which is ten. The tetractys of Pythagoras, which is pic-
tured in the School of Athens by Raffaello Sanzio, “contains and holds to-
gether all things, which flow forth in musical harmony,”39 according to 
Kircher. The tetractys is perceptible in all things in that all the elements of 
the material world can be divided into four parts, for example the four ele-
ments, the four cardinal points of the compass, and the four points of the 
Greek cross. The progression from the point to the cube entails a progression 
from the divine mind to the angelic intellect, to the soul or spirit and to the 
body (the intellect is divided into both divine and human parts, following Fi-
cino). “In the unity of the monad is contained the simple and absolute Divine 
Mind or Essence which produces everything. The dyad contains the unity of 
the angelic intellect, the trinity contains the soul or spirit, the cube contains 
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the body.”40 In this way the reason of the divine mind is perceptible in the 
body. 
        This corresponds to Kircher’s description in the Arithmologia of the ge-
ometric analogue of creation: “The pyramid is drawn from the beginning 
point or Monad, and is extended to the base on two sides, constructing the 
triangle, as the image and archetype of the Platonic triune world.”41 The ine-
quality of the trinity then incites motion and multiplicity in a cycle of motion 
from unity to multiplicity back to unity, corresponding to Ficino’s circuitus 
spiritualis, a current of supernatural energy flowing through the structure of 
the universe, enlivening and animating it. 
        The hypostases of being consist of the terrestrial world of corporeal 
forms, dense, intertwined and in shadow; then the rationalization of the cor-
poreal forms in the angelic mind; and finally the resolution of the forms in 
their absolute archetypal unity. The hypostases of being are modelled in the 
Universal Figure of Nicolas Cusanus, with the three figures of body, soul and 
mind inscribed in each of the three levels of the hierarchy, containing the 
nine choruses of Pseudo-Dionysius in the celestial hierarchies, representing 
the structure of the universe, as illustrated in a diagram, “Quator dictarum 
Monadum Schematica explicatio,” in Kircher’s Musurgia universalis. The 
same hierarchy of forms, intertwined on the terrestrial level, rationalized and 
ordered on the celestial level, and resolved and simplified on the divine level, 
can be seen on the frontispiece of Kircher’s Arithmologia. The cosmic dia-
gram is based in underlying numerical progressions and proportions in the 
tradition of Renaissance Humanism.  
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This essay was developed from sections of three chapters: “Philosophy of Vision” in 
Robert Grosseteste: Philosophy of Intellect and Vision, Sankt Augustin: Academia 
Verlag, 2010 “Perception as a function of desire in the Renaissance” in Renaissance 
Theories of Vision, London: Routledge, 2010; and “Light, Vision and Numerology” 
in The Relation Between Architectural Forms and Philosophical Structures in the 
Work of Francesco Borromini in Seventeenth-Century Rome, Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen, 2002. Additional discussion of Plotinus was added. 
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